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INTERSTATE RENDITION AS APPLIED TO A
PERSON BROUGHT INYVOLUNTARILY
INTO THE SURRENDERING STATE
FORREST REVERE BLACK*

On January 27, 1937, a Pennsylvania Common Pleas decision,
Church v. Hackenburg,' emphasized anew the confusion growing
out of interstate rendition proceedings in connection with prisoners
who have been forcibly brought into the state for service of a
Federal sentence and who on release from the Federal Penitentiary
are wanted by another state. This decision by an inferior court
challenges the legislative ingenuity of the states and of the nation.
The facts in the Church case were as follows: On March 29,
1932, the petitioner, Walter Church, pleaded guilty in a criminal
court of the State of New York to attempted robbery, on which
charge he was sentenced by the New York State court to serve a
term of two and a half to five years in the New York State Penitentiary at Ossining, New York. On the 21st of August, 1933, the
petitioner was paroled from the New York State Penitentiary by
the New York State Parole Commission and required to report
from time to time to the proper officer of said Parole Commission.
On October 1, 1933, the Parole Commission revoked the parole of
Church on the ground that he failed to report. On January 10, 1934,
Church was arrested by New York State authorities at White Plains,
New York, charged with passing and having in his possession counterfeit money and was then identified as a parole violator. On
July 18, 1934, he was indicted in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York for the unlawful passing
and possessing of counterfeit money. On July 19, 1934, the petitioner was turned over by the New York State authorities at
White Plains, New York, to the United States Marshal for the
Southern District of New York. While in the custody of the said
* Special Assistant to the Attorney General, Department of Justice, Washing-

ton, D. C. Formerly Professor of Law in the University of Kentucky and in
George Washington University.
I Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel Walter Church v. Hackenburg,
Sheriff of Union Co., Pa., by Curtis J. Lesher, Common Pleas Judge for Union Co.,
Pa., No. 100, January Term, 1937.
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authorities of the State of New York, Church was interviewed by a
representative of the New York State Parole Commission, who was
informed as to the identity of the petitioner and as to the facts and
circumstances surrounding his arrest on the charge of passing and
possessing counterfeit money.
The petitioner, Church, on July 19, 1934, entered a plea of
guilty to said charges and was sentenced to serve three years on
three different counts in the indictment, all three sentences to run
concurrently, and on August 14, 1934, he was removed from the
State of New York to the United States Northeastern Penitentiary
at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, by the United States Marshal, at which
place he remained confined until November 8, 1936, at which time
he was released.
Prior to his release, the Governor of the State of New York
instituted extradition proceedings against Church, charging that he
was a parole violator and had fled from justice of the State of New
York. The Governor of Pennsylvania had found'that Church was
a fugitive from justice of the State of New York. The Governor
of Pennsylvania, in granting extradition, acted on the following
statutory authority: "It is the duty of the Governor of this State
to have arrested and delivered up to the executive authorfty of any
other state of the United States any person charged in that state
with treason, felony, or other crime, who has fled from justice and
2
is found in this State."
Section 124 of the same title provides: "A warrant of extradition must not be issued, unless the documents presented by the
executive authority making the demand show that the accused
was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, and that he thereafter fled from justice in
that state and is now in this state, and that he is lawfully charged,
by indictment found, or by an information filed by a prosecuting
officer and supported by affidavit to the facts, or by affidavit made
before a magistrate in that state, with having committed a crime
under the laws of that state, or that he has been convicted of crime in
' 3
that state, or has escaped from confinement or broken his parole.
The petitioner contends that he did not request his removal
from the State of New York to Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, but that
on the contrary he was forcibly, and against his will, brought into
the State of Pennsylvania, with the knowledge and presumably the
2
3

Purdon's Pa. Stats. Ann., Title 19, sec. 121.
Ibid., Title 19, sec. 124.
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consent of the New York State authorities. It is the contention of
the New York State Parole Commission that the fact that the
petitioner was found within the confines of the State of Pennsylvania, and that he was a parole violator on a criminal charge, was
sufficient ground to sustain extradition.
Common Pleas Judge Lesher denied this contention and held
that Church was not a fugitive from justice of the State of New
York. The court -aid "As a matter of fact, Church was not allowed
the opportunity to return to his own state when released from the
United 8tates Penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. He was
met at the gates of the penitentiary-at the time of his release by the
Sheriff of Union County, Pennsylvania, and immediately taken into
custody and placed in jail. We feel that the Governor of Pennsyl-

vania had no authority to issue a warrant for the delivery of the
petitioner to the New York authorities for the purpose of returning
him to the State of New York, and the prayer of the petition must
be granted, and the Sheriff of Union County must be directed to
release the petitioner, Church."

It shall be our purpose to explore the possibilities of State and
Federal legislative remedies so as to provide for the effective interstate rendition of a person brought involuntarily into the surrendering state.
The constitutional sanction for interstate rendition is found in

Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution which provides:

"a person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime;
who shall flee from justice.and be found in another State, shall, on

demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled,
be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction
of the crime."
This constitutional provision is not self-executing. Mr. Justice
Story in Priggv. Pennsylvania,' said, "The Constitution, although it
expressly provides, that the demand shall be made by the executive
authority of the state from which the fugitive has fled, is silent as
to the party upon whom the demand is to be made, and as to the
mode in which it shall be made . . . the right and the duty are

dependent, as to their mode of execution solely on the act of Congress; and but for that, they would remain a nominal right and
passive duty, the execution of which being entrusted to and required of no one in particular, all persons might be at liberty fo
disregard it."
441 U. S. 539, 620.
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Federal statutes dealing with interstate rendition.

(a)
The Act of February 12, 1793. The fundamental Federal
statute was passed on February 12, 1793, and was based on a
report of Edmund Randolph, Attorney General of the United States,
in the Washington administration; and grew out of a dispute between Pennsylvania and Virginia as to the right of interstate renditiom This statute is still in force and its constitutionality was upheld in the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania.
The act of 1793 has been reproduced in the Revised Statutes of
the United States in the following form:
"Sect. 5278. Whenever the executive authority of any State
or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the
executive authority of any State or Territory to which such person
has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit
made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the
person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other
crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate
of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled,
it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the State or
Territory to which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested
and secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be given to the
executive authority making such demand, or to the agent of such
authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive
to be delivered to such agent wlen he shall appear. If no such
agent appears within six months from the time of the arrest, the
prisoner may be discharged. All costs or expenses incurred in the
apprehending, securing, and transmitting such fugitive to the State
or Territory making such demand, shall be paid by such State
or Territory."5
(b)
District of Columbia. By the sixth section of the act of
March 3, 1801,6 Congress made special provision for the rendition
of criminals taking refuge in the District of Columbia. This provision is now embodied in the Revised Statutes relating to the
District of Columbia, as follows:
"Sect. 843. In all cases where the laws of the United States
provide that fugitives from justice shall be delivered up, the chief
justice of the supreme court shall cause to be apprehended and
delivered up such fugitive from justice who shall be found within
the District, in the same manner and under the same regulations
518 U. S. C. A. 662 (1927).
6 2 Stats. at L. 115.
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as the executive authority of the several States are (sic) required
to do by the provisions of sections fifty-two hundred and seventyeight and fifty-two hundred and seventy-nine, Title LXVI, of the
Revised Statutes, 'Extradition;' and all executive and judicial officers are required to obey the lawful precepts or other process
issued for that purpose, and to aid and assist in such delivery."
(This law does not cover the case of a fugitive from the District. Such a case is covered by section 1014 of the Revised Statutes
of the United States.)
(c) Offenders against Federal Law. By section 33 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789,7 provision was made four the recovery of
fugitive offenders against the laws of the United States. As
amended, this provision is reproduced in the Revised Statutes of
the United States, as follows:
"Sect. 1014. For any crime or offense against the United States,
the offender may, by any justice or judge of the United States, or
by any commissioner of a circuit court to take bail, or by any
chancellor, judge of a supreme or superior court, chief or first
judge of common pleas, mayor of a city, justice of the peace, or other
magistrate, of any State where he may be found, and agreeably to
the usual mode of process against offenders in such State, and at
the expense of the United States, be arrested and imprisoned, or
bailed, as the case may be, for trial before such court of the United
States as by law has cognizance of the offense. Copies of the
process shall be returned as speedily as may be into the clerk's
office of such court, together with the recognizances of the witnesses for their appearance to testify in the case. And where any
offender or witness is committed in any district other than that
where the offense is to be tried, it shall be the duty of the judge
of the district where such offender or witness is imprisoned, seasonably to issue, and of the marshal to execute, a warrant for his
removal to the district where the trial is to be had." 8
H. Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States on
the question of what constitutes a "fugitive from justice."
At the outset, it should be noted that there is no decision by the
Supreme Court of the United States that deals directly with the
question raised in the Church case. There are, however, several
71 Stat. at L. 91.
8 Removal from one Federal District to another under S.. 1014 is unlike
extradition or interstate rendition, in that the protection owed by a sovereign to
those within its territory is not involved. U. S. ex rel. Karrin v. Mulligan, 295
U. S. 396, 399, 400. See Hardy, Removal of Federal Offenders.
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Supreme Court decisions that attempt to define what constitutes a
"fugitive from justice," and for purposes of convenience we have
classified these under three headings.
(A) Method of return to State where crime was committed
(whether by forcible abduction or fraud) is not open to complaint.
In Mahon v. Justice,9 one Mahon was indicted for murder in
the State of Kentucky but before his arrest he fled to the State of
West Virginia. The governor of the former State by requisition
demanded of the executive of the latter State the arrest and surrender of Mahon as a fugitive from justice, this demand, for some
reason was refused. Whereupon the agent of Kentucky with other
citizens of his State, by force took possession of Mahon and brought
him back to Kentucky. The chief executive of West Virginia demanded of the governor of Kentucky the return of Mahon, this also
was refused; thereupon the governor of West Virginia sued out a
writ of habeas -corpus in the Federal court of Kentucky, praying for
the discharge of Mahon, alleging that his (Mahon's) then detention
in Kentucky was unlawful because he had not been removed from
West Virginia in accordance with the Constitution and laws of the
United States. Upon a hearing the writ was quashed and the petition was dismissed, the court holding that Mahon was lawfully held
in custody in Kentucky. 0 An appeal was taken to the Supreme
Court of the United States and after due consideration the judgment
of the lower court was affirmed. In the course of an able opinion
the court used this language:
"So in this case, it is contended that, because under the Constitution and laws of the United States a fugitive from justice from
one State to another can be surrendered to the State where the
crime was conmitted, upon proper proceedings taken, he has the
right of asylum in the State to which he has fled, unless removed in
conformity with such proceedings, and that this right can be enforced in the courts of the United States. But the plain answer to
this contention is, that the laws of the United States do not recognize
any such right of asylum, as is here claimed on the part of a fugitive
from justice in any State to which he has fled; nor have they, as
already stated, made any provision for the return of parties, who,
by violence and without lawful authority, have been abducted from
a State. There is therefore, no authority in the courts of the
United States to act upon any such alleged right."
9127 U. S. 714 (1887).
10 In re Mahon (1887) 34 Fed. 525.
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In Pettibone v. Nichols,1 the court said: "Even if the arrest
and deportation of one alleged to be a fugitive from justice may
have been effected by fraud -and connivance arranged between the
executive authorities of the demanding State and the surrendering
State so as to deprive him of any opportunity to apply before deportationto a court in the surrendering State for his discharge, and
even if on such application to -any court, State or Federal, he would
have been discharged, he cannot, so far as the Constitution and laws
of thei nited.States are concerned-when actually in the demanding
State, in the custody of its authorities for trial, and subject to -the
jurisdictionthereof-be discharged on habeas corpus by theFederal
court. It would be improper-andinappropriate-in the Circuit Court
to inquire as to the motives guiding -or-controlling the action of -the
governors -of the demanding -and-surrendering -States.
"No obligation is imposed by the Constitution and laws of The
United -States on the agent -of -a demanding-istate to so time the
,arrest of one alleged to be. a Lugitive :from justice zanl -so conduct
,his deportation from the.surrendering.State-as-to afford him-a nonvenient opportunity, before -some judicial tribunal, -sitting In the
latter State, upon habeas corpus or otherwise, to test -the:uestion
whether he was .a 'ugitive _from justice -and -as :such liable,, unier
the act of -Congress, to be -conveyed to -the Aemanding State I5or
trial there. ' '
In Lascelles v. Georgia,' dt was -held that "a £fugitive from
justice who has 'been surrendered by one 'State of the-_Uiiion to
another State, upon requisition charging him with -the commission
of a specific crime, has, under the -Constitution and laws -of the
'United -States, no right, privilege or immunity to be -exempt -from
indictment and trial, in the -State to which :he-is x.eturned, for any
other or different offense from that -designated -in -the -reguisition,
without -first having an opportunity to -return to the iState rom
which.he was extradited."
The case of -Cookv. _HarV-4 was -an a-ppealfrom -an -order -of'the
Circuit Court of the -United -States, bIor the :Eastern DistAict -of
Wisconsin, dismissing a -writ of habeas corpus -and memanding the
relator, Charles -E.Conk, to -the:custody of the-Wisconsin authorities
"r203 U.'S. 192 (1906).
same doctrine was announced in the -cases of the ro-delfendants 2Haywood and Moyer; ;Haywood v. Nichols, 203 YE.S. 222 (1906) .and oqyer-v. -Nichols,
203 U. S. 222 (1906).
3_146 U.5.
1543 (1893).
14 146 U./S. 183 (1892).
12flie
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for trial in its courts. Cook had previously been arrested in the
State of Illinois by virtue of a governor's warrant which was issued
upon a requisition of the governor of Wisconsin, charging Cook with
the commission of crime against the laws of that State and with
being a fugitive from its justice. When arrested in Illinois he sued
out a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that he was not a fugitive
from Wisconsin and upon a hearing in the former State, his petition
was dismissed and he was delivered to the agent of Wisconsin and
at once carried to the demanding State. Cook acquiesced in the
disposition of his case in the courts of Illinois, making no effort
whatever to have the supreme court of that State review the judgment of the lower court. Upon his arrival in Wisconsin and just
as his trial had begun in that State, he sued out another writ of
habeas corpus in the circuit court of the United States, alleging that
he was unlawfully deprived of his liberty, in that he was not a
fugitive from Wisconsin when arrested in Illinois and that therefore
he was illegally deported from that State. The Federal court in
Wisconsin decided against him and he prayed an appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States which affirmed the judgment
of the lower court. The court reaffirmed the doctrine in the case of
Mahon v. Justice, supra, and held that "the supreme court will not
interfere to relieve persons who have been arrested and taken by
violence from the territory of one State to that of another, where
they are held under process legally issued from the courts of the
latter State. That the question of the applicability of this doctrine
to a particular case is as much within the province of a State court,
as a question of common law or of the law of nations, as it is of
the courts of the United States." The court further held that it
is too late for the alleged fugitive from justice to object to even
jurisdictional defects, after he is brought within the territory of
the demanding State and further declared that, the authorities
tended to support the theory that the executive warrant has spent
its force, when the accused has been delivered to the demanding
State.
(B) The Supreme Court of the United States has repudiated
the doctrine of "constructive presence" within the State wliere the
crime was committed.
5
In the case of Hyatt v. People ex rel. Corkran,1
the court said:
"The language of section 5278, Revised Statutes, provides, as we
think, that the act shall have been committed by an individual who
15188 U. S. 691 (1903).
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was at the time of its commission personally present within the
Thus the person who is
State which demands his surrender ....
sought must be one that has fled from the demanding State, and he
must have fled (not necessarily directly) to the State where he is
found. It is difficult to see how a person can be said to have fled
from the State in which he is charged to have committed some act
amounting to a crime against that State, when in fact he was not
within the State at the time the act is said to have been committed.
How can a person flee from a place that he was not in? He could
avoid a place that he had not been in; he could omit to go to it;
but how can it be said with accuracy that he has fled from a place
in which he had not been present? This is neither a narrow, nor,
as we think, an incorrect interpretation of the statute, it has been
in existence since 1793, and we have found no case decided by this
court wherein it has been held that the statute. covered a case
where the party was not in the State at the time when the act is
alleged to -have been committed."
In Strassheim v. Daily"' it was held that "One who is never
within the State before the commission of a crime producing its
results within its jurisdiction is not a fugitive from justice within
the rendition provisions of the Constituton, but if he commits some
overt and material act within the State and then absents himself,
he becomes a fugitive from- justice when the crime is complete; if
not before. Although absent from the State when the crime was
completed in this case, the party charged became a fugitive from
justice by reason of his having committed certain material steps
toward the crime within the State, and the demanding State is
eiititled to his surrender under article IV, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States and the statutes providing for the
surrender of fugitives from justice."
In Ex parte Hoffstot 17 the court held that the "Petitioner, -a
resident of New York, indicted in Pennsylvania for conspiracy to
bribe members of the Pittsburgh city council, could not be extradited in the absence of some proof that he had been physically
present in Pennsylvania when the offense was committed, as otherwise he could not be a fugitive from the justice of that State. Where
there was specific evidence that petitioner, a resident of New York,
participated there in a conspiracy to bribe members of the city
council'of Pittsburgh to select certain banks in Pittsburgh, one of
i6 221 U. S. 280 (1911).
17 218 U. S. 665 (1910).
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which petitioner was president, as city depositories, and there was
substantial evidence from which a jury would be justified in drawing an inference that petitioner was in Pittsburgh on a day when
some act or acts in furtherance of the conspiracy were performed,
there was sufficient proof that he was a fugitive from justice to
justify his extradition to Pennsylvania."
'(C)
The alleged "fugitive" must have left the State in which
the crime is alleged to have been committed. It is immaterial as to
his motive, purpose or reason for leaving.
(It should be noted that none of the cases referred to below
deal with the problem of involuntary leaving of the State by the
alleged criminal wherein the crime was charged to have been
committed.)
The court, in Roberts v. Reilly,' said, "To be a fugitive from
justice in the sense of the act of Congress regulating the subject,
under consideration, it is not necessary that the party charged
should have left the State in which the crime is alleged to have
been committed, after an indictment found, or for the purpose of
avoiding a prosecution anticipated or begun, but simply that having within a State committed that which by fhe laws constitutes
a crime, when he is sought to be subjected to its criminal process
to answer for his offense, he has left its jurisdiction and is found
within the territory of another."
In Bassing v. Cady'9 it was held that "One charged with crime
and who was in the place where, and at the time when, the crime
was committed, and who thereafter leaves the State, no matter for
what reason, is a fugitive from justice within the meaning of the
interstate rendition proceedings of the Constitution, and of section
5278, Revised Statutes, and this none the less if he leaves the State
with the knowledge and without the objection of its authorities."
The court, in Ex parte Hoffstot,20 said that "Where accused has
committed a crime in one State, and afterwards leaves it, the right
of extradition exists, without reference to his purpose in going."
The case of Drew v. Thaw"2 held that "A party to a crime who
afterwards leaves the State is a fugitive from justice; and, for the
purposes of interstate rendition, it does not matter what motive
induced the departure."
'8116 U. S.80 (1885).
19 208 U. S. 386 (1907).
20 218 U. S. 665 (1910).

21235 U. S.432 (1914).
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III. The Act of 1793 is not coterminous with the constitutional
provision.
(a) In one respect, the Act of 1793 is broader than the con'stitutional provision. The act includes territories but the constitu22
tional provision does not include territories. In Ex Parte Morgan,
Judge Parker of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Arkansas, expressed the opinion that the Act of 1793 as
applied to territories was constitutional,-not perhaps, under the
rendition clause of the Constitution, but under the clause conferring upon Congress power to regulate territories. But the Supreme Court of the United States, in Ex parte Reggel, 3 held that
the Act of 1793 must be given the same effect in the case of a
fugitive from a State to a territory as where the demand is made
upon the Governor of a State. The theory of this case, apparently,
2
is that the rendition clause would justify this broader legislation.
(b) The Act of 1793 is narrowerthan the constitutional provision in that the act provides not for the surrender of the fugitive
by the State in which he is found, but only for a surrender by the
State into which he has fled. The Act of 1793 Was intended, beyond
question, to emphasize the doctrine of flight, for it will be observed
that the words "has fled"
are used three times in this section in
25
referring to the fugitive.
The leading case dealing with the problem outlined in III (b)
supra is Innes v. Tobin.'1 Here the plaintiff had been extradited
to Texas from Oregon, on charge of murder, and tried and acquitted
in the courts of the former State. However, without being released
from custody, the plaintiff was then surrendered, upon extradition
proceedings, to the authorities of Georgia from whose justice she
was charged to be a fugitive. Habeas corpus proceedings having
been instituted, and the case having reached the Supreme Court
upon writ of error, that court held that the case was not covered
by the legislation of Congress," and that this failure upon the part of Congress so to provide left the matter within the discretionary
power of the States to act as they might see fit according to the
general principles of comity. The court said:
22 20 Fed. 298.

23 114 U. S. 642.
24 See John Bassett Moore, Extradition and Interstate Rendition, Vol. 2, pages
849, 850.
25 See Scott on Interstate Rendition, p. 70.
26 240 U. S. 127.
27 Rev. Stats., sec. 5278.
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"No reason is suggested nor have we been able to discover any,
to sustain the assumption that the framers of the statute, in not
making its provisions exactly coterminous with the power granted
by the Constitution, did so for the purpose of leaving the subject,
so far as unprovided for, beyond the operation of any legal authority
whatsoever, State or National. On the contrary, when the situation
with which the statute dealt is contemplated, the reasonable assumption is that the omission to extend the statute to the full limits
of constitutional power it must have been intended to leave the
subjects unprovided for not beyond the pale of all law, but subject
to the power which then controlled them,--State authority until
it was deemed essential by further legislation to govern them exclusively by National authority. In fact, such conclusion is essential
to give effect to the act of Congress, since to hold to the contrary
would render inefficacious the regulations provided concerning the
subjects with which it dealt. This becomes manifest when it is
considered that, if the proposition now insisted upon were accepted,
it would follow that the delivery of a criminal who was a fugitive
from justice by one State on a requisition by another would exhaust
the power, and the criminal, therefore, whatever might be the extent
and character of the crimes committed in other States, would remain in the State into which he had been removed without any
authority to deliver him to other States from whose justice he had
fled. And this, while paralyzing the authority of all the States, it
must be moreover apparent, would cause them all to become involuntary asylums for criminals; for no method is suggested by
which a criminal brought into a State by requisition, if acquitted,
could be against his will deported, since to admit such power would
be virtually to concede the right to surrender him to another State
as a fugitive from justice for a crime committed within its lorders.
It follows from what we have said that the court below was right
in refusing to discharge the accused, and its judgment, therefore,
''
must be and it is affirmed.

28

IV.

The problem of "extraterritorial"crime.
In 1920, Judge A. H. Reid of Wisconsin, delivered an address
before the American Bar Association 29 dealing with the hiatus in
the law governing the extradition between states of persons charged
with "extraterritorial" crimes. The problem here involves a situa28

For discussion of case see Willoughby on the Constitution, Vol. I, pp. 298, 299.
Am. Bar Assn. Reports 432.

2945
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tion where X in State B shoots Y in State A. In this case the
crime is committed in State A, but X is in State B and is not a
fugitive from justice.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws approved, in 1926, The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.
That act, according to the latest figures, has been adopted in eight
States. Section 6 of this act specifically deals with the hiatus outlined in Judge Reid's address and illustrates the effectiveness of
auxiliary legislation on the part of the States. Section 6 of The
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act reads as follows:
"The Governor of this state may also surrender, on demand of
the Executive Authority of any other state, any person in this state
charged on indictment found in such other state with committing
an act in this State intentionally resulting in a crime in such other
state; and the provisions of this act not otherwise inconsistent shall
apply to such cases, notwithstanding that the accused was not in
that state at the time of the commission of the crime, and has not
30
fled therefrom."
No cases have been found clearly upholding this type of legislation as applied to "extraterritorial" crimes. However, it is stated
in Cyc. that:
"As the Constitution, however, applies only to fugitives from
justice, a state may, in the exercise of its reserved sovereign power,
provide for the surrender of persons indictable for crime in another state, but who have never fled from it."'
In State v. Wellman 2 a Kansas court, by way of dictum, said:
"While the Federal statute does not impose a duty upon the governor of a state to recognize a requisition for the delivery of a
person who is accused of an offense committed -while he was not
personally present within the State whose laws he is charged with
breaking, there would seem to be no legal obstacle to a state's
providing by statute for the surrender of a person within its jurisdiction to a state whose laws he is accused of violating while not
physically within its borders, although without such legislation no
authority therefor exists."
Mr. Spear, in his work on Extradition and Interstate Rendition,33 takes the position that the problem of "extraterritorial"
309

U. L. A. IMl.

3119 Cyc. 85; also II R. C. L. 732.
32 170 Pac. 1052; see also State v. Hall, 20 S. E. (N. C.) 729).
33 P. 316.
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crimes can be dealt with only by State legislation and not by Federal legislation under the existing Constitution. He says:
"The Constitution may be amended, and then the laws of the
United States may be amended so as to cover such cases; or state
laws may be enacted to furnish a remedy which is not now supplied
by either. Either method is possible, and there certainly should
be some method for awarding justice in this class of cases."
V. Congress might impose the duty of interstate rendition on
Federal authorities.
John Bassett Moore, in his treatise on Extradition and State
Rendition," says: "The act of 1793 is not, however, by any means
to be considered as a finality. Congress might enact further laws
covering the whole ground, or might impose the duty of arresting
and surrendering fugitives upon the Federal authorities. There is
nothing in the Constitution that requires the demand to be made
upon the governor of a State, or upon any other State authority,
executive or judicial."
On March 11, 1840, Mr. Lumpkin, of Georgia, submitted to the
Senate a set of resolutions of the legislature of that State, with
accompanying documents, in favor of Congress amending the act
of Feb. 12, 1793, to carry into effect sec. 2, art 4 of the Federal
Constitution, relating to surrender of fugitives from justice between
States. By way of preface to its specific recommendations, the
General Assembly of Georgia states:
"Doubtless the past legislation on this subject has been predicated upon the presumption that each State having, in the pledged
faith of all the others, a sufficient guaranty, nothing more was
requisite than to prescribe the forms which should give authenticity
to the demand; doubtless, too, in the time which gave birth to the
constitution, whilst the Union was young, and her revolutionary
associations fresh and warm, this presumption found its warrant in
the mutual fidelity which promptly responded to all executive demands. To this generation has been reserved the humiliating
spectacle of a sovereign State making herself a city of refuge for
fugitive felons from her sister confederates. Two such cases of
recent occurrence demonstrate the utter inefficiency of the existing
laws for carrying into effect this provision of the constitution.
They, moreover, clearly indicate the cause of this inefficiency.
These laws are dependent for their execution upon the mere will
34
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of the executive officers of the several States, who neither are, nor
can be made, responsible to the General Government. If, then,
it be correctly assumed that the Federal Legislature is bound to
make ample provision for the contemplated exigency, and if experience has proved that reliance on State authorities is delusive, the
question occurs, whether there be any other mode which gives
fairer promise of security. May not the object be accomplished by
employing in that service officers appointed by, and responsible to,
the Federal Government? Inasmuch as that Government has employed in every State of the Union competent, judicial, and ministerial officers, it is believed that this duty, enjoined by the highest
obligations, and intimately connected with the harmony and perpetuity of the Union, may be appropriately and efficiently performed
through their instrumentality. There would seem to be a peculiar
fitness in providing that the aid which she is bound to afford to the
State judiciaries should result from the action of her own judiciary.
The process would be simple, and the agents directly responsible,
to the power whence the laws to be executed emanate.
"Be it therefoie resolved, That the-statutes of the United States
enacted to carry into effect the latter clause of the second section
of ihe fourth article of the constitution are wholly inadequate to
the object.
"Be it further resolved, That, in the opinion of this General
Assembly, those statutes should be so amended as, first, to authorize
the demand in the cases contemplated to be made upon the circuit
judge of the United States having jurisdiction in the State wherein
such fugitive may be found; secondly, to require that such judge,
upon such demand being made in due form of law, shall issue his
warrant, to be directed to the marshal of the United States in the
State wherein such fugitive may be, requiring his arrest and delivery to the agent duly authorized to receive him, who shall be
named in such warrant; thirdly, to require each marshal to whom
any such warrant shall be delivered, forthwith to execute the
35
same.)
VI. Conclusions.
Is it possible by Federal or state legislation to effectuate the
interstate rendition of persons who have been brought involuntarily
into the surrendering state?
35 Sen. Doc. Vol. 5, 26 Cong., 1st Sess., 273.
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(A) The possibility of Federal legislation.
(1) Unquestionably, Congress might impose the duty of interstate rendition on Federal authorities.3
There is nothing in the
Constitution that requires the demand to be made upon the Governor of a state, or upon any other State authority, executive or
judicial. This type of legislation might obviate the difficulty encountered in the case of Kentucky v. Dennison,3 7 in which the court
said that there was a "moral duty" resting on the Governor of Ohio,
but that if he "refuses to discharge this duty, there is no power
delegated to the General Government, either through the Judicial
Department or any other department, to use any coercive means
to compel him." The Supreme Court of the United States had
intimated in the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania,38 nearly twenty
years before, that there was no power lodged in the general government to compel State officers to perform the duties imposed upon
them by the Act of 1793. Chancellor Kent had expressed the same
9
view in his Commentaries many years -earlier3
(2) In case Congress does not enact legislation coterminous
with the constitutional provision, it is possible for the Federal authorities to cooperate with the States, in such a situation as is presented by the Church case, and to transfer the prisoner before his
term has expired to a penitentiary within the demanding State, and
it would be within the scope of constitutional power for Congress,
in its control over Federal prisons, to authorize and require such
transfer of prisoners and provide regulations governing the entire
procedure.
(3) In the light of the Innes v. Tobin decision, if the Federal
statutes were made coterminous with the constitutional provision,
would it be possible to effectuate the interstate rendition of prisoners in Northeastern Penitentiary (Pennsylvania) who are serving
sentences for crimes committed outside of that State; and who,
upon release from the Federal penitentiary, are demanded by an-'
other State? The Innes decision, although by a unanimous court,
is a typically prolix and abstruse piece of legal reasoning by Mr.
Chief Justice White. However, there are two statements in the
decision by way of dicta that might furnish the basis for an- affirmative answer to the query posed supra. At one place Mr. Chief
38 John Bassett Moore, Extradition and Interstate Rendition, Vol. 2, p. 848;
In Matter of Voorhees, 32 N. J. L. 140, 146.
37 24 Howard 66 (1860.
38 16 Paters 539.
39 2 Kent Commentaries 32, note (h) (12th Ed.).
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"It is conceded (that the Constitution) would

cover the case and sustain the authority exercised, as the accused
was a fugitive from the State of Georgia and was found in Texas."4'
Again, he declares, "The reasonable assumption is that by the omission to extend the statute to the full limits of constitutional power,
it must have been intended to leave the subjects unprovided for
not beyond the pale of all law, but subject to the power which then
cohtrolled them-State authority until it was deemed essential by
further legislation to govern them exclusively by National author41
ity."

For the very good reason that Congress has never passed

legislation coterminous with the Constitutional provision, it cannot
be said that the problem of the right (under Federal law) of a
demanding State to receive a person who has been brought involuntarily into the "surrendering" State, has been settled squarely by
any decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.
It is true that the rendition in the Innes case was based on a
Texas statute, 42 and thus strictly, this decision stands for the proposition that auxiliary State legislation must be relied on for the
remedy. However, John Bassett Moore, commenting on the case
of Mahon v. Justice,' in which it was held that the Governor of
the State had no legal right to demand- from the Governor of another State the return of a person who had been wrongfully taken
from the jurisdiction of the former by an agent of the latter said:
"But considering the case solely from the point of view of the
prisoner, of what right can it be said that he is deprived by his
delivery up to a third State? It is not his right to have the question
of his surrender determined by the Governor of any particular
State. That question is, under the Constitution, to be determined
in any State in which he may be 'found.' That does not mean that,
having once been found in a certain State, he is entitled thereafter
to have the question of his rendition for all prior offenses determined by the Governor of that State, until he shall have left its
jurisdiction voluntarily. Yet this is precisely what is signified by
the right of return to the jurisdiction of the surrendering State, as
held to exist in extradition cases; the reason being that the fugitive,
when recovered, was under the protection of the surrendering
nation. This principle (of asylum) possesses no relevancy to the
States -of the United States."' '
4o P.

133.

41 P. 135.

42Vernons Texas Stats., Art. 1088 C. C. P.

43 127 U. S. 700.
44 Extradition and Interstate
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However, from the practical point of view, it is extremely
doubtful if Federal legislation that was coterminous with the Constitution would solve the problem. It is significant that the very
statute construed by Judge Lesher in the Church case was worded
in such a manner as to be coterminous with the constitutional provision rather than with the Federal Act of 1793. Section 2 of The
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act adopted by the Pennsylvania
legislature reads:
"It is the duty of the Governor of this State to have arrested
and delivered up to the executive authority of any other State of
the United States any person charged in that State with treason,
felony or other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in this
State."45
In spite of this language, Judge Lesher holds that Church is
not a fugitive from New York for the reason that he was brought
into the State of Pennsylvania involuntarily.
It might be argued that Congress could amend the Act of 1793,
making it coterminous with the Constitution, and then provide in
addition for a definition of "fugitive" which would include specifically the case of a person brought into a State involuntarily.
However, it is doubtful whether such legislation would stand the
test of constitutionality, inasmuch as the constitutional sanction for
this type of Federal legislation is found only in the interstate rendition clause. 6
(B) The possibility of State legislation.
The practical way to meet the problem involved in the Church
case would be for the States, under their reserved powers, to expressly provide for the interstate rendition of persons who were
brought to the State involuntarily and were charged with crime
committed in the demanding State. The States, in enacting legislation of this type would not be conditioned by the "fugitive" concept
of the provision of the United States Constitution dealing with
interstate rendition.
(1) It will undoubtedly be conceded that the power- to surrender fugitives from justice existed in the several states'prior to
459
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Our conclusion with reference to the effectiveness of Federal legislation
that is coterminous with the constitutional provision is in accord with the position
of Mr. Charles A. McCarthy in his article, "A Constitutional Question Suggested
by the Trial of William D. Haywood" in 19 Green Bag 636. This article was
written prior to the Innes decision.
46
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the adoption of the Constitution, as an attribute of sovereignty."
In Prigg v. Commonwealth, 8 Mr. Justice Story states that the right
to surrender fugitive slaves as a matter of comity existed in the
several states before the adoption of the Constitution; and the power
to surrender fugitives from justice is clearly analogous in this
respect.
(2) If the power existed before, as an attribute of sovereignty,
then it subsisted after the adoption of the Constitution, upon the
same ground, unless it was surrenderedt by the-States. Whether or
not it was so surrendered is the important question. Of course in
this connection the writer is speaking of the powei to deliver -up
a fugitive as a matter of comity, and not -the power to demand such
delivery. The latter power is not an attribute of sovereignty, and
never" existed in the states until it was created by the provision of
the Federal Constitution. , In State v. Hall 9 the court says, "But in
the exercise of its reserved .sovereign, powers, the state may, as an
act- of comity .to a sister state, provide by statute, for the surrender,
upon requisition, of persons who, like the prisoners, are indictable
for .murder in another state, though they have never fled from
justice."
(3) The statement of Mr. Justice Story in the case of Prigg v.
Pennsylvania,° that, the legislation of Congress on the subject of
interstate rendition was exclusive, was only supported by two other
members of that. court, Mr. Justices Wayne and McLean. Chief
Justice Taney, Mr. Justice Thompson and Mr. Justice Daniel dissented on the question of exclusiveness of congressional power.
Mr. Justice Baldwin held the Act of 1793 to be unconstitutional.
The' casa of Innes v. Tobin recognizes the power of the.States to
pass laws supplementary to and in aid of the Constitution and the
Act of Congress dealing with fugitives from justice. John Bassett
Moore, 511 writing prior to the Innes case, says that the right of the
States to pass auxiliary legislation "is firmly established. The Act
of 1793 does not cover the whole ground. It makes no provision
for the arrest of a fugitive pending a demand for his surrender,
nor for the method of making arrests before or after such demand.
It does not provide for the method of delivery. It refers to the
47 In
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re William Fetter, 23 N. J. L. 311; State v. Hall, 115 N. C. 811, 28 L. R. A.

16 Peters 535; 10 L. Ed. 1060, at page 1092.
115 N. C. 811, 28 L. R. A. 289, 292.
50 16 Peters 539, 632.
51 Extradition and Interstate Rendition, Vol. 2, p. 864.
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'agent' of the 'executive authority making such demand,' but does
not provide for his appointment nor for the method of delivering
the fugitive to him. In these respects at least, in which the action
of the State authorities is contemplated but not defined, it might
be supposed that there was room for State regulation."
(4)

Sec. 6 of The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act 52 deals

with-the problem of "extraterritorial" crime and is not conditioned
by the "fugitive from justice" concept. While there is no authoritative decision upholding its constitutionality, The Uniform Code
was approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws more than a decade ago, and at least eight
states have adopted it.
(5) Mr. Charles McCarthy, in a thought-provoking article
dealing with interstate rendition, 53 submits the following analogy:
"Section 1 of Article IV of the Constitution of the United States
provides 'Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State.
And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved and the
effect thereof.' Congress has passed a statute to this end. Many
of the states have passed statutes requiring less by way of certification or other proof, than is required by the Act of Congress. The
constitutionality of these statutes has never been questioned, for
they do not impair the constitutional obligation. The Supreme
Court of the United States has held that a judgment in an action in
personam, based upon service by publication, need not be given due
faith and credit under the Constitution. Haddock v. Haddock, 50
L. Ed. 857, and other cases there cited. But while so holding the
court says that it intimates no doubt as to the power of a state to
give a judgment of that character 'such efficacy as it may be'entitled
to in view of the public policy of that state.' 50 L. Ed. at 884. If
a state may act outside of the mandate of the Constitution in regard
to the judicial proceedings of a sister state, so long as it does not
violate its constitutional obligation, why may it not so act in regard
to rendition of fugitives from justice?"
L.
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